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     The Honorable Gustave Diamond, Senior District Judge for the United States District*
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  05-3620
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v.
ANTUAN DICKS,
Appellant
             
_____________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Judge:  The Honorable Legrome D. Davis
District Court No. 03-cr-00266-1
 _____________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 14, 2008
                                           
Before: SLOVITER, and SMITH, Circuit Judges, 
DIAMOND, District Judge*
(Filed: February 14, 2008)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
2SMITH, Circuit Judge:
With this appeal, Antuan Dicks argues that he is entitled to a new trial because (1)
the District Court erroneously admitted other crimes evidence pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”); (2) the defense has been unable to
obtain a complete transcript and reconstructing such a transcript pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 10(c) would be impossible; and (3) the District Court
erred when it failed to suppress evidence obtained from the search of Dicks’ residence at
5466 Morse Street.  Because the parties and the District Court are familiar with the case’s
operative facts, we offer only an abbreviated recitation to explain why we will affirm.
On June 29, 2004, at the conclusion of a week-long jury trial, Dicks was convicted
of (1) conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 50 grams of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) possession of more than 500 grams of
cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); (3)
possession of more than 50 grams of cocaine base with the intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); (4) possession of more than 500 grams of
cocaine with the intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 860; and (5) possession of more than 50 grams of cocaine base with the
intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 860.  The District Court sentenced Dicks to life imprisonment.  Dicks filed a timely
     The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise1
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
notice of appeal.     1
I.
In January of 2003, the Philadelphia Police Narcotics Field Unit executed a search
warrant for 5466 Morse Street in Philadelphia.  The police found Dicks in the living room
of the house and arrested him and his co-defendants, John Ramsey and Corey Long.  A
complete search of the residence resulted in the seizure of significant quantities of both
cocaine base and powder cocaine, digital scales, an amber pot that had been used to
“cook” powder cocaine into cocaine base, and other items of contraband.
John Hand, who pleaded guilty to drug charges in an unrelated federal case,
testified at trial about sales of crack cocaine by Dicks and others to him during the time
frame of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.  Hand also testified that he had sold
cocaine and cocaine base with Dicks prior to being incarcerated in 1996.  At trial, the
government also introduced evidence of Dicks’ prior conviction for drug trafficking, as
well as testimony from a federal probation officer who testified that he was supervising
Dicks’ release as a result of that same earlier conviction.  The jury convicted Dicks of the
charges noted above.  
II.
Dicks argues that he is entitled to a new trial for three distinct reasons.  First, he
4contends that the District Court erred in admitting, pursuant to Rule 404(b), the three
pieces of evidence described in the preceding section that detail Dicks’ past involvement
in the drug industry.  We review the District Court’s decision to admit evidence under
Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 100 (3d
Cir. 2004).  Rule 404(b), which governs the admissibility of character evidence, provides
that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  “The Supreme Court gives four guidelines on the admissibility of
prior bad act evidence.”  United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992)
(internal citations omitted).  Specifically:
(1) the evidence must have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must
be relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its
prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) the court must charge the jury to
consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted.
Id.  Accordingly, “where the evidence only goes to show character, or that the defendant
had a propensity to commit the crime, it must be excluded. Where, however, the evidence
also tends to prove some fact besides character, admissibility depends upon whether its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.”  Id. at 887.  
Evidence of past drug convictions and activities are admissible in a case involving
a drug-related offense if offered for a valid purpose.  Id.  Where the government offers
5such evidence, however, it must “clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of
logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the defendant has the
propensity to commit the crime charged.”  United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 354
(3d Cir. 2002).  Here, the government offered the evidence at issue for a valid purpose. 
Accordingly, the District Court properly admitted it. 
First, the government offered evidence of Dicks’ prior conviction to prove that
Dicks possessed the requisite knowledge and intent to commit the drug offenses with
which they charged him.  As we held in United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir.
2003), evidence of a prior drug conviction is admissible to show knowledge and intent
because such a conviction makes it more probable that the defendant had knowledge of
the instant drug distribution scheme.  Id. at 461.  Similarly, John Hand’s testimony
regarding his prior drug dealing relationship with Dicks, which pre-dated the instant
indictment, was admissible because it is relevant to an acceptable purpose under Rule
404(b).  Such testimony was relevant in that it provided context regarding Hand’s
relationship with Dicks and enhanced the credibility of Hand’s testimony regarding
events charged in this case.   Evidence of prior uncharged activity between a defendant
and one of his co-conspirators is admissible in order to give the jury “a complete story of
the crime by explaining the circumstances of the alleged relationship between the alleged
conspirators . . . ”).  United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Finally, Probation Officer Todd Morrow’s testimony that Dicks was on supervised
6release, because of the drug conviction previously discussed, was properly admitted
because it (1) explained why Morrow was keeping track of Dicks’ residence; and (2) lent
credibility to Morrow’s testimony that Dicks resided at 5466 Morse Street because lying
about his residence would have constituted a violation of the terms of Dicks’ supervised
release.  Dicks concedes that Morrow’s testimony was relevant to a valid purpose, but
nonetheless contends that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.  We disagree, especially
given that evidence of Dicks’ past drug conviction and drug activities were already
admissible for the reasons articulated above.  Additionally, the record shows that the
District Court properly provided a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the purpose
for which they could consider all of the contested evidence described above.
In sum, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting, pursuant to Rule 404(b), evidence detailing Dicks’ past involvement in the
drug industry.   
Dicks also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the defense has been
unable to obtain a fully complete transcript and reconstructing such a transcript would be
impossible.  28 U.S.C. § 753(b) provides, in relevant part, that “each session of the
court  . . . shall be record[ed] verbatim  . . . . ”  However, we have held that “the failure to
comply with the Court Reporter Act [section 753] does not warrant reversal without a
specific showing of prejudice . . . .  United States v. Sierra,  981 F.2d 123, 125 (3d Cir.
1992). Dicks has not made such a showing.
     We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress “for clear error as to the2
underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application
of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).
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The primary prejudice that Dicks points to is his lack of access to “the piece of
evidence which introduced the defendant’s prior drug conviction and the testimony of
Probation Officer Todd Morrow.”  The record would be more clear if it contained that
evidence, but we fail to see how its absence prejudices Dicks’ ability to contest, on
appeal, the District Court’s admission of certain “other acts” evidence given that the
substance of the evidence in question is not in doubt.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
record is sufficient to enable meaningful appellate review and that Dicks is not entitled to
a new trial based upon the absence of a complete transcript.  
Finally, Dicks argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the District Court
erred when it failed to suppress evidence obtained from the search of Dicks’ residence at
5466 Morse Street.  Specifically, Dicks contends that the affidavit supporting the search
warrant for the Morse Street residence (1) did not establish probable cause and (2) “was
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable,” such that the police could not rely on the good faith exception to the
warrant requirement.   We disagree.2
“When faced with a challenge to a magistrate’s probable cause determination, a
reviewing court must remember that its role is limited.  It is not to conduct a de novo
review.  Rather, it simply ensures that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
8concluding that probable cause existed.”  United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1055 (3d
Cir. 1993).  Here, Dicks argues that there was no “substantial basis” for the magistrate to
conclude that probable cause existed.  Specifically, Dicks contends that the Affidavit of
Probable Cause was deficient because it failed to (1) note the criminal background, if any,
of the confidential informant cited within it; (2) adequately establish the reliability of the
confidential informant; and (3) cite any independent police corroboration of the
information the confidential informant provided.  Dicks’ arguments are unavailing.
First, there is no requirement that police detail the criminal background, if any, of a
confidential informant.  The test is simply whether the Affidavit as a whole provided a
substantial basis for the magistrate judge to conclude that probable cause existed. 
Second, the record indicates that the Affidavit at issue did establish the reliability of the
confidential informant.  For example, the Affidavit notes that the confidential informant
had previously made numerous controlled narcotics purchases, which led to the arrest of
several persons.  Additionally, the police corroborated information the confidential
informant provided regarding where the drugs Dicks supplied were being sold, and by
whom.  
Accordingly, we are well satisfied that the four corners of the Affidavit established
probable cause.  We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.
